{"id":1355,"date":"2013-07-09T14:19:55","date_gmt":"2013-07-09T13:19:55","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/lpp.psycho.univ-paris5.fr\/feel\/?page_id=2"},"modified":"2013-07-09T14:19:55","modified_gmt":"2013-07-09T13:19:55","slug":"researchproject","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/whatfeelingislike.net\/?page_id=1355","title":{"rendered":"Research Project"},"content":{"rendered":"<h3>Overview<\/h3>\n<p>Philosophers divide the problem of\u00a0consciousness\u00a0into two parts: An easy part, which involves explaining how one can become aware of something in the sense of being able to make use of it in one&#8217;s rational behaviour. And a hard part, which involves explaining why certain types of brain activity should actually give rise to feels: for example the feel of &#8220;red&#8221; or of &#8220;onion flavor&#8221;. The &#8220;hard&#8221; part is considered hard because there seems logically no way physical mechanisms in the brain could generate such experiences.The sensorimotor theory (ORegan, 2011) has an answer to the &#8220;hard&#8221; problem. The idea is that feel is a way of interacting with the environment. The laws describing such interactions, called sensorimotor contingencies, determine the quality of how a feel is experienced. For example, they determine whether someone experiences a feel as being real or imagined, as being visual or tactile, and how a feel compares to other feels. The sensorimotor theory provides a unifying framework for an understanding of\u00a0consciousness, but it needs a firmer conceptual and mathematical basis and additional scientific testing.<\/p>\n<p>To do this, a first, theoretical goal of the FEEL project is to provide a mathematical basis for the concept of sensorimotor contingency, and to clarify and consolidate its conceptual foundations. A second goal is to empirically test scientific implications of the theory in specific, promising areas: namely, color psychophysics, sensory substitution, child development and developmental robotics. The expected outcome is a fully-fledged theory of feel, from elementary feels like &#8220;red&#8221; to more abstract feels like the feel of sensory modalities, the notions of body and object. Applications are anticipated in color science, the design of sensory prostheses, improving the &#8220;presence&#8221; of virtual reality and gaming, and in understanding how infants and possibly robots come to have sensory experiences.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Overview Philosophers divide the problem of\u00a0consciousness\u00a0into two parts: An easy part, which involves explaining how one can become aware of something in the sense of being able to make use of it in one&#8217;s rational behaviour. And a hard part, &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/whatfeelingislike.net\/?page_id=1355\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":1,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/whatfeelingislike.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1355"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/whatfeelingislike.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/whatfeelingislike.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/whatfeelingislike.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/whatfeelingislike.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1355"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/whatfeelingislike.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1355\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/whatfeelingislike.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1355"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}